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In general models, the strong quasi-concavity of the objective function, sufficient for 
theoretical properties of demands in consumer theory, is often arbitrary. Then, 
weaker global concavity conditions that preserve such properties are desirable for 
such models. We propose a new global concavity condition that implies, for models 
with  several nonlinear constraints: the local uniqueness and the smoothness of the 
decision functions, and the negativity of the generalised substitution matrix. This 
condition can be used to specify more general and more flexible economic models. 
 





The global uniqueness, the smoothness of the demands and the negative semi-
deﬁniteness of the substitution matrix are among the main theoretical restrictions
in consumer theory. The strong quasi-concavity of the utility function (SQC) is a
suﬃcient global condition for these restrictions1.I ti sac o r n e r s t o n eo fc o n s u m e r
and general equilibrium theories. As a matter of fact, global concavity assump-
tions in economics or in other domains are often responsible for many crucial
properties of the used models. They play an essential role in that they largely
express the structure of the model, without which a direct empirical approach
excluding any formal theory could as well be pursued. Global conditions are im-
portant because, as opposed to local conditions, one can impose or check them a
priori excluding any knowledge of the optimal decisions.
Although theoretical properties can also be developed for demand correspon-
dences, the uniqueness of the demands considerably simpliﬁes the analysis2.I t
enables one to separate considerations related to the inaccuracy of choices, from
the study of decision changes with characteristics of agents and environment. In
consumer theory, the uniqueness of the demands is global. The same legitimate
1Arrow and Enthoven (1961), Debreu (1972, 1976) discuss these quasi-concavity
assumptions.
2Ellis (1976).
2desire of focusing on the law of decisions is valid for general models. However,
global uniqueness is not necessarily appropriate for a decision problem with several
constraints. Consider for example the consumption of a person who can obtain
his consumption from two distinct domestic technologies. Assume that only the
production frontier is observed. Assume also that one technology is enjoyable
but has low productivity, while the other technology has opposite characteristics.
Then, if the arguments of the person’s utility are the penibility of domestic work
and consumption, she may be indiﬀerent between two solutions corresponding
each to one of these technologies. One does not wish to artiﬁcially eliminate this
reasonable situation by imposing a unique global solution. Then, what is required
is that the decisions are locally unique. The smoothness of the decision functions
is also important since it allows an easy study of the comparative statics and
other variational properties of decisions. All this explains why SQC or similar
assumptions are fundamental in consumer economics.
The negativity of the substitution matrix is another a major theoretical restric-
tion. In economic theory, many authors stress the importance of the negativity
and symmetry restrictions of the Slutsky matrix in consumer theory3.O t h e ra u -
3e.g. Barten (1977), Afriat (1983), Varian (1984), Takayama (1985), Beavis and
Dobbs (1990), El-Hodiri (1991). Shapiro and Braithwait (1979) begin their article with
a quotation of Samuelson (1961): “The assumption that [the Slutsky matrix is] ...
3thors use the negativity of the Slutsky matrix, or similar properties, to derive
suﬃcient conditions for the law of aggregate demand, which supports the exis-
tence of the competitive equilibrium of the whole economy4.I nt h es t u d yo fp r i c e
dynamics in general equilibrium, negativity restrictions or related conditions en-
sure globally stable equilibria5. In applied work, these restrictions are used to
incorporate theoretical results in estimated models6.
Unfortunately, the strong quasi-concavity of the utility function that delivers
all these restrictions has few theoretical or empirical bases. The quasi-concavity
of the utility is related to preference by individual of ‘mixtures’ of commodities
to unbalanced consumption structures. However, various authors are dissatis-
ﬁed with the hypothesis of strict convexity of preferences (equivalent to the strict
quasi-concavity of the utility function, itself very close to SQC)7.A l s o ,e x p e r i m e n -
symmetrical and negative semi-deﬁnite completely exhausts the empirical implications
of utility analysis. All other demand restrictions can be derived as theorems from this
single assumption”.
4e.g. Hildenbrand (1983), Grandmont (1987), Quah (1997).
5Khilstrom, Mas-Colell, Sonnenschein (1976).
6See Samuelson (1947), Kalman and Intriligator (1973), Chichilnisky and Kalman
(1978), Deaton and Muellbauer (1980), Varian (1984), Chung (1994). Kodde and Palm
(1987) discuss a parametric test of the negativity of the substitution matrix. In the con-
text of cost function estimation, Gallant and Golub (1984), Diewert and Wales (1987),
Koebel et al. (2003) propose methods for imposing curvature conditions on speciﬁc ﬂex-
ible functional forms. The latter ones insist on the importance of imposing concavity
globally, consistently with economic theory. Imposition or veriﬁcation of the negativity
in applied demand systems is common practice.
7e.g. Kirman (1982). Other ‘technical’ conditions on preferences have been attacked
as altering the empirical content of models (Ghirardato and Marinacci, 2001).
4tal evidence contradicts the convexity of preferences8. In fact, the convexity of
consumer preferences is intuitive only when comparing standard average baskets
with extreme consumption choices concentrated only in few commodities. When
comparing two rather balanced commodity baskets, the intuition is somewhat lost
and SQC looks rather arbitrary.
Even if we admitted SQC for the consumer case, this would be less tolerable
for other models. Thus, the presence of heterogenous arguments in the objective
function may allow for diﬀerent ‘life styles’ or strategies, which may imply non-
convexities in preferences. For example, this is the case for the fertility choice
between having a large family with limited human capital, or a small family with
educated and healthy members. Collective settings for aggregate household deci-
sions may also contradict the convexity of household preferences9. In trade theory,
in resource economics or in macroeconomics, a country objective function is not
necessarily quasi-concave10. Finally, in some models the decisions are the charac-
teristics of contracts or preferences may directly incorporate some constraints11.
There is no reason why the objective function should be quasi-concave in these
cases. Clearly, it is desirable to dispose of alternative conditions to the SQC.
8Tversky and Kahneman (1991).
9Chiappori (1988), Browning and Chiappori (1998).
10Dawid and Kopel (1997).
11e.g. Stiglitz and Weiss (1992), Heim and Meyer (2004).
5In this paper, we provide a new global generalised concavity condition adapted
to models with several constraints, possibly non-linear. These models are used in
several economic ﬁelds. The New Household Economics12 and agricultural house-
hold models13 involve production and budget constraints. Models with non-linear
budget constraints arising from quality eﬀects14, non-linear taxation15,l a b o u r
supply with work costs16, productive consumption17, nonlinear wage schedules18,
rationing19, and non-linear pricing by ﬁrms with monopoly power, are also charac-
terised by non-linear constraints. Finally, international trade theory, the study of
ﬁrst-best and second-best optima20, collective household models21,o ro t h e rt y p e s
of bargaining or incentive models, may include several non-linear constraints for
agents’ optimal choices.
In general settings, no global generalised concavity condition is known that
would be as weak as possible for the negativity of the substitution matrix and
12Becker (1965), Lancaster (1966).
13Sen (1966), Barnum and Squire (1980), Pitt and Rosenzweig (1985), Singh, Squire
and Strauss (1986), Benjamin (1992).
14Houthakker (1952), Edlefsen (1981, 1983).
15Hausman (1985), Weymark (1987).
16Heim and Meyer (2004)
17Suen and Hung Mo (1994).
18Blomquist (1989).
19Madden (1991).
20Ben-Israel, Ben-Tal, Charnes (1977), Dixit (1985).
21Chiappori (1988, 1992), Browning and Chiappori (1998).
6the smoothness and local uniqueness of decisions22. Is there such a condition and
what are its properties? The aim of this paper is to answer these questions so as
to improve the speciﬁcation of general economic models. In Section 2, we present
the general optimisation problem. In Section 3, we recall the consequences of SQC
in consumer theory and we analyse a new global generalised concavity condition
for optimisation programmes with several constraints. In Section 4, we study the
properties of the decision functions under this condition. Finally, we conclude in
Section 5. The proofs are given in the appendix.
2. The Optimisation Problem
General behavioural models with several constraints can be represented by the
following programme:
max
x U(x,θ) subject to : g(x,θ) ≤ 0q, (2.1)
where U is the objective function, which is often assumed to be strictly quasi-
concave (or strictly concave, e.g. in Varian, 1984). x ∈ Rn is the n-dimensional
22Silberberg (1974), Hatta (1980), Caputo (1999) and Drandakis (2000) study prob-
lems with several constraints by using dual methods, although they do not deal with
global concavity conditions.
7vector of decision functions, θ ∈ Rp is the vector of parameters that may be
prices and incomes as well as any characteristics of the environment or of the
agent. We allow for parameters common to the objective and the constraints23.
However, these parameters will be omitted for the presentation when they are
not necessary. g is a q-dimensional vector of constraint functions. The decisions
may be of any type, including possibly negative values, as for variables such as
netputs or net trading positions. Positive decisions can be accounted for in the
constraints. The set of choices, X,d e ﬁned by the constraints, is often assumed
to be convex. Appendix 1 contains the deﬁnitions of the generalised concavity
notions that we use in this article, with their properties that are employed.
To be able to use the ﬁrst-order Kuhn-Tucker conditions (KTC) as necessary
for the existence of a solution, one must assume a constraint qualiﬁcation con-
dition. We follow the common practice of assuming that the gradient vectors of
the components of g are linearly independent. Despite their intrinsic interest,
changes in regime may correspond to discrete discontinuity jumps of decisions,
23Often, exogenous variables or random eﬀects inﬂuence preferences as well as con-
straints. This is useful for applied agricultural household models (Singh, Squire and
Strauss, 1986, Pitt and Rosenzweig, 1985), for evolutionary economics (Lesourne, 1993,
Young, 1993) and for models in which preferences depend on random states of Nature
that may also aﬀect constraints (Viscusi and Evans, 1990). Finally, for Pareto optima,
bargaining and incentives models, objective and constraints that all include utility func-
tions, may incorporate the same common characteristics of preferences.
8which would justify not paying much attention to negligible marginal substitu-
tion eﬀects. In these situations, the negativity property and the smoothness of
decisions lose most of their appeal as theoretical restrictions. At solutions where
the strict complementarity slackness fails, comparative statics may be problem-
atic because the set of binding constraints may change as the parameter changes,
destroying the diﬀerentiability of the solutions. To avoid these problems, prac-
titioners generally assume that non-negativity constraints would not bind, but
all other constraints always bind. Moreover, researchers are often concerned only
with the solutions of one speciﬁc regime of interest (one set of binding constraints).
This leads us to focus on the following Lagrange conditions, which are the KTC
associated with such a speciﬁc regime.
Ux − gx λ =0 n
g(x,θ)=0 q
(2.2)
where 0q is the q-dimensional vector null and λ is the q-dimensional vector of
the Lagrange multipliers. The Lagrange function associated with the problem is
L = U− λ
0g.We now discuss global concavity conditions for behavioural models,
9ﬁrst by examining the link of global conditions and local properties of decisions.
3. Global Concavity Conditions
Theoretical restrictions for the decisions similar to those obtained with SQC in de-
mand theory can be obtained from the suﬃcient second-order conditions (SSOC)
of the optimisation programme, for example in Blackorby and Diewert (1979).
However, without a global concavity condition this approach involves several
shortcomings. Firstly, the derived decision functions may not satisfy desirable
global properties. For example, ﬂexible functional forms used in consumer analy-
sis have been criticised on the grounds that they did not easily allow the global
imposition of the convexity of preferences (Diewert and Wales, 1987). Secondly,
the consistency of the local duality structures presupposes some global concavity
properties (Blackorby and Diewert, 1979). Thus, for the consumer problem the
expenditure function must be concave in prices over its domain or the direct utility
function must be quasi-concave over its domain. Without these global concavity
conditions there is no correspondence of the respective second-order approxima-
tions of the expenditure function and of the direct utility function. Meanwhile,
t h eg l o b a lc o n d i t i o n sa l l e v i a t ed i ﬃculties that may arise for the coincidence of the
10domains of the local utility function and of the other local dual representations of
preferences. Therefore, even if local approximations are useful, they do not allow
for a precise control of global properties of objective and constraints and of the
consistency of the dual. Thirdly, global concavity conditions are used to incor-
porate decision models in general equilibria frameworks describing the economy
by a unique and stable solution. On the whole, one needs global generalised con-
cavity conditions on the optimisation problem, even for obtaining desirable local
properties of decision functions. This has been a fertile approach in the economic
literature, notably to obtain local uniqueness and diﬀerential properties of deci-
sions24. Besides, local uniqueness, smoothness and semi-deﬁnite negativeness of
decisions are global properties when they must be satisﬁed for the whole domain.
In the consumer problem, the only constraint (to simplify the exposition we
ignore any positivity constraint) is the linear budget constraint and x is the vec-
tor of consumption. The utility function U is generally assumed to be of type
C2, strictly increasing in the consumption of every commodity and strictly (or
strongly) quasi-concave. Under these assumptions, the vector of demands is de-
rived from the Lagrange ﬁrst-order conditions of the optimisation programme.
24e.g. Debreu (1972), Arrow and Enthoven (1961), Laroque (1981), Smale (1982),
Dana (1999), Shannon and Zame (2002).
11From the budget constraint, one can derive the adding-up and homogeneity re-
strictions that are somewhat speciﬁc to the consumer problem. The other theo-
retical restrictions characterise the Slutsky matrix S a n da r ed i s c u s s e di nA f r i a t
(1983). The symmetry property (S is a symmetric matrix) results from the sepa-
ration structure of the optimality problem. The negativity property results from
the assumption of strong quasi-concavity of U (Diewert, Avriel and Zang, 1981),
which implies the suﬃcient second-order conditions (SSOC): S is orthogonal to
the price vector and is negative deﬁnite in the hyperplane orthogonal to the price
vector. However, the SSOC would not satisfy us because we search for a global
condition.
For general models, SQC may be weakened. Weakening the conditions for
properties of optimal solutions is important in mathematical programming25 and
in economics26 since it limits arbitrary restrictions. We search for a generalised
global concavity condition that is as weak as possible and implies the local unique-
ness and smoothness of decision functions and the negativity of the generalised
substitution matrix.
The necessary (respectively suﬃcient) local second-order conditions correspond
25Avriel (1976), Hiriart-Urruty (1996), Auslender (2000).
26Debreu (1983).
12to the local negative semi-deﬁniteness (respectively the local negative deﬁniteness)
of the Hessian matrix of the Lagrange function with respect to decisions at the
optimum (respectively, at the optimum for directions in the tangent space to the
constraints)27. However, we are not interested by local concavity conditions but by
global ones. Moreover, because each constraint function and objective function
is separately speciﬁed in economic models and sometimes separately estimated
from diﬀerent datasets, we look for a condition that can be explicitly expressed
in terms of these functions, rather than in terms of the Lagrange function. Next,
we recall the deﬁnition of the strong quasi-concavity.
Deﬁnition 3.1. Let U be a directionally diﬀerentiable real function deﬁned over
ac o n v e xs u b s e tXo fR n. U is called Strongly Quasi-Concave over X if and
only if
[x0 ∈ X,v0v =1 ,¯ t>0,x 0 + ¯ tv ∈ X,DvU(x0)=0 ]⇒
[∃ε>0,∃α>0,ε<¯ t, ∀t ∈ [0,ε],U (x0 + tv) <U(x0) − αt2],
where Dv denotes the directional derivative operator in direction v.
Equivalent notions have been used28.I fU is twice diﬀerentiable, an equivalent
deﬁnition is the following (Diewert, Avriel and Zang, 1981).
27See Afriat (1971) for a discussion.
28Dhrymes (1967), Barten, Lempers and Kloek (1969), Newman (1969), Ginsberg
(1973), McFadden (1978). See also Barten and Böhm (1982) for a discussion of the
13Deﬁnition 3.2. Let U be a twice diﬀerentiable real function deﬁned over a convex
subset X of Rn.Ui sStrongly Quasi-Concave (SQC) if and only if ∀(x,y) ∈
X2, such that x 6= y,
(∇U(x)0(y − x)=0 )⇒ (y − x)0∇
2U(x)(y − x) < 0.
We now introduce a new notion of generalised concavity by changing the
premises of this deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 3.3. The twice diﬀerentiable objective function U subject to a diﬀer-
entiable vector of constraint functions g, is called
Constraint − StronglyQuasi − Concave (CSQC29 ) with respect to g if
and only if U is twice diﬀerentiable on X convex subset of RN,a n d
∀(x,y) ∈ X
2 suchthat x 6= y and g(x)=0 q,
(∇g(x)(y − x)=0 and ∇U(x)
0(y − x)=0 )= ⇒
(y − x)
0 ∇
2U(x)(y − x) < 0. (3.1)
T h eC S Q Cm u s tb ec h e c k e df o ra l lp o i n t sx satisfying the constraints, in
properties of strongly quasi-concave utility functions in consumer theory. Crouzeix,
Ferland and Zalinescu (1997) extend this notion to sets and relate it to inf-compactness.
Quasi-concave functions in a non-diﬀerentiable context are discussed in Calzi (1992).
29To simplify the presentation, we use CSQC both for ‘Constraint-Strong Quasi-
Concave’ and ‘Constraint-Strong Quasi-Concavity’.
14particular for x non-optimal. This is a crucial requirement, since, at the stage
of model speciﬁcation, the actual optimum may be unknown. The CSQC diﬀers
from the SSOC by several elements. First, it is global. Second, an orthogonality
condition involving the gradient ∇U intervenes in the premises of the CSQC and
not in that of the SSOC. Third, the negativity condition in the conclusion of the
CSQC is for ∇
2U, whereas it is for ∇
2L in the SSOC. Also, the CSQC diﬀers
from the SQC by the presence in the premises of the choice set and orthogonality
conditions with respect to the constraint gradients.
The fact that the constraints intervene in the CSQC is more natural than it
may seem at ﬁrst sight, because both objective and constraints characterise the
optimisation problem and they should therefore be considered together. Novshek
(1980) states that “the second-order conditions impose constraints on the curva-
ture of level sets for f relative to the curvature of level sets for g [here f describes
the objective and g describes the constraints]. The absolute properties of [f ij(x)]
(positive deﬁnite, negative deﬁnite, corresponding to a saddle point, etc.) are
unimportant. The properties of [f ij(x)] relative to [gi
j(x)] are important.”T h i s
quote is consistent with the deﬁnition of the CSQC in which the curvature prop-
erties of U are considered relatively to g 30.
30See also Ben-Tal (1980) for second order conditions involving Hessian functions and
15The tangent subspace at x to the constraints and to the indiﬀerence hyper-
surfaces (i.e. the subspace orthogonal to the gradients of functions gi(i =1 ,...,q)
and U) generates a diﬀerential manifold, as x varies along the frontier of the con-
straints. This manifold is generally nonlinear and is neither a hyperplane as in
consumer theory with one linear constraint, nor a sub-vector space as when con-
sidering only local conditions with several constraints. It is exclusively along this
manifold that the negativity of ∇
2U is imposed by the CSQC.
The sole consideration of the frontier of the constraints in the deﬁnition of the
CSQC is motivated by the search for as weak a condition as possible. Indeed,
since the objective function is generally speciﬁed as increasing in its arguments, it
is generally useless to incorporate restrictions occurring at points that are never
reached at the equilibrium because they are not at the frontier.
Some functions U and g may yield an empty set of directions corresponding
to the premises of the deﬁnition of the CSQC. When that is the case, essentially
no arbitrary restriction of generalised concavity is imposed on the optimisation
problem. However, this seems unlikely to happen in models of interest. In order
to characterise the CSQC by the shape of the graph of the objective function, we
need an additional deﬁnition.
curvatures.
16Deﬁnition 3.4. f : X convex set ⊂ R → R attains a strong local maximum
(SLM) at t0 ∈ Xi fa n do n l yi f∃α>0,∃ε>0,∀t ∈ [t0 − ε,t0 + ε] ∩ X, f(t) ≤
f(t0) − α(t − t0)2.
Intuitively, a function attains a SLM when its curvature to the origin at the
maximum is at least as strong as that of a quadratic function. Deﬁnition 3.1 shows
that a strongly quasi-concave function U is such that for directions v orthogonal
to ∇U in x0, h(t) ≡ U(x0 + tv) attains a SLM at t =0 . We now show that
the CSQC can also be characterised in terms of SLM in some directions. By
considering particular values of α,o n ec a ne x t e n dt h i sc h a r a c t e r i s a t i o nt od e ﬁne
properties of ‘α-constraint-quasiconcavity’, similarly to the α-quasiconvexity in
Crouzeix, Ferland and Zalinescu (1997).
Proposition 3.5. Let U be a twice diﬀerentiable function over X. Then,
U CSQC with respect to g over X if and only if
(x0 ∈ X,v0v =1 ,¯ t>0,x 0+¯ tv∈ X,∀i =1 ,...,q,gi(x0)=0and ∇gi(x0)0v =
0 and ∇U(x0)0v =0 )⇒ h(t) ≡ U(x0 + tv) attains a SLM at t = 0 .
It is well known that the convexity of a function f(x) is equivalent to the
convexity of its epigraph, Ep(f), the set of couples (x,y) where y ≥ f(x).T h e
following proposition characterises the epigraph in the case of CSQC.
17Proposition 3.6. Let the function U, from X convex set of Rn to R, be CSQC
with respect to the vector of constraints g. We consider the graph of U:
∂Ep(U) ={ ( x 1,...,x n,U(x1,...,x n))|(x1,...,x n) ∈ X},
and we deﬁne a “g—U-admissible” direction at x, as d ∈ Rn such that ∇gi(x)
0d =
0, for all i and ∇U(x)
0d =0(i.e. a direction of the domain generated by the tan-
gent space to the constraints and to the indiﬀerence hypersurfaces). Then,
(a) the frontier of the epigraph of U is strictly below all its tangent hyperplanes,
in any g—U-admissible direction at the frontier of constraints;
(b) the curvature (to the origin) of the frontier of the epigraph of U in any
g-U-admissible direction at the frontier of constraints is strictly positive;
(c) the dimension of the subspace spanned by the ∇gi (i =1 ,...,q),w h i c hi s
q because of the constraint qualiﬁcation condition, is greater than the number of
positive or null eigenvalues of ∇
2U at the frontier of constraints.
Condition (b) can be shown to correspond to a strictly positive curvature
of the objective function obtained by substituting the constraints in the initial
objective, as in Afriat (1971). Condition (c) illustrates that the more constraints
the less restrictive is the CSQC. The index ‘n − (the number of positive eigen-
values of ∇
2U )’ can be used as an index of non-convexity31.I nav o nN e u m a n n -
31More general indices of non-convexity are proposed by Thach and Konno (1995).
18M o r g e n s t e r nf r a m e w o r k ,t h eC S Q Ci sr e l a t e dt or i s ka v e r s i o ni nt h ed o m a i n so f
choices deﬁned by the constraints and by the indiﬀerence hypersurfaces. It is worth
noting, as the next proposition shows, that CSQC utility functions can be ordinal
and therefore that they correspond to relevant restrictions on the representation
of preferences.
Proposition 3.7. The CSQC is an ordinal property of the preferences.
In the next section, we examine the consequences of the CSQC for the deci-
sions.
4. The Properties of the Decision Functions under CSQC
4.1. The Link of CSQC with SQC and the Second-Order Conditions
We now turn to the link of the CSQC with the SQC and the SSOC, not only
because of the intrinsic interest of these conditions, but also because the SSOC is
a convenient intermediate to derive some properties of decisions. First, the CSQC
and the SQC can be ranked.
Proposition 4.1. If function U is strongly quasi-concave, then it is CSQC.
19The reciprocal proposition is not true because, even at the optimum, ∇U
0v =0
does not generally imply ∇gi0v =0for all i. When there are several constraints,
the CSQC is a weaker condition than the strong quasi-concavity, because it is
associated with a local curvature that is strictly positive only in a sub-space of
dimension n − q or generally n − q − 1, and only at the frontier of the con-
straints, while this curvature must be strictly positive in a whole hyperplane for
U strongly quasi-concave. The CSQC is an assumption that does not locally im-
pose any structure on the preferences in a subspace of dimension q at least, and
therefore globally in a large domain. Moreover, out of the frontier of the con-
straints, the CSQC is tantamount to the absence of restrictions32.W en o wt u r n
to the relationship between the CSQC of the Lagrange function and the CSQC
of the objective function, as a ﬁrst step towards the second-order conditions of
optimality.
32The case of families of constraint and utility functions with θ varying instead of
given a priori, leads to obvious generalisations and stronger global conditions, although
still weaker than SQC. These generalisations do not change the core of our results.
20Proposition 4.2.
If g is quasi-convex, the CSQC of the utility function implies the CSQC of the
Lagrange function associated with the optimisation programme, whether calculated
with optimal or non-optimal Lagrange multipliers.
The CSQC of the Lagrange function is important because it characterises the
shape of the optimisation problem under CSQC of the objective function. How-
ever, the Lagrange function cannot be directly used to impose structural condi-
tions, because of its dependence on a priori unknown Lagrange multipliers. More-
over, applied researchers want to impose restrictions on objective and constraint
functions independently, not on a combination of them. The following proposition
shows that CSQC ensures that the second-order conditions are satisﬁed when the
choice set is convex33.
Proposition 4.3. If g is quasi-convex, then U CSQC implies the suﬃcient local
second order conditions of optimality.
The contention that g is quasi-convex is little restrictive since it is equivalent
to assume that the choice set is convex. By contrast with the necessary second-
33This does not imply that any optimal situation must satisfy the CSQC. For example,
(x − 2)4 does not satisfy the CSQC, but it has a minimum at x =2 .
21order conditions, the SSOC are not necessary the consequences of any optimi-
sation programme. A condition like CSQC is required to obtain the SSOC. Lo-
cally, SSOC implies the negativity of the generalised substitution matrix (Pauwels,
1979). However, without global conditions one would have to know the optimum
t ob ea b l et oap r i o r ic h e c kS S O Ci nat r a c t a b l ew a y .W ea r en o wr e a d yt oe x a m i n e
the properties of the decision functions under CSQC.
4.2. The Properties of the Decision Functions
In consumer theory, the budget set is bounded, therefore compact in ﬁnite di-
mension. This implies that there is always a solution to the maximisation of an
upper semi-continuous utility function. In general models, the choice set inside
a given regime is deﬁned as C = {x ∈ Rn,g(x,θ)=0 q} and is no longer neces-
sarily bounded. Firstly, we consider a non-empty choice set C to avoid absurd
situations. Secondly, the problem optimum is given by the KTC and corresponds
to a tangential contact point of the constraint frontier with an indiﬀerence hy-
persurface. The CSQC yields strict curvatures that seems to geometrically imply
the existence of the optimum. Surpr i s i n g l y ,t h i si sn o tt h ec a s e 34 and additional
34Indeed, in the following example there is no optimum. Let be a 2-dimensional vector
of decisions x =( x1,x 2)0 ∈ R2, and a constraint vector of one dimension described by
the equation: x1 + x2 =1 . Assume that the objective function U is strictly increasing
and diﬀerentiable in x1 and x2, and CSQC. Because the constraint is a unique line, this
22assumptions are necessary to guarantee the existence of the optimum. Since U
and g are continuous, if one assumes that the decisions belong to a bounded set
Ξ, then the choice set C is compact and is not empty by hypothesis, and an upper
semi-continuous utility function has a maximum in this set. Another possibility is
to assume that U is coercive, upper semi-continuous on a closed feasible set with
at least one point where U is ﬁnite.
We now present a characterisation of the CSQC in terms of a bordered Hessian,
similarly to consumer theory with strong quasi-concavity (Barten & Böhm, 1982).
This is interesting ﬁrst because this type of characterisation is usual for various
concavity conditions, and also because determinants can be easily calculated from
data to check these concavity conditions. The non-singularity of another related
bounded Hessian will be necessary to the derivation of properties of decisions.
Proposition 4.4. Let be
is obtained with U strongly quasi-concave. But there exist families of strongly convex
indiﬀerence curves that satisfy these conditions and are asymptotically tangent to the
constraint when x1 goes to +∞ or x2 goes to -∞. In that case, there is no optimum
since the contact point is at the inﬁnite.
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(a) If U is CSQC, then H is non-singular at any solution of the KTC.
(b) If U is CSQC and g is quasi-convex, then J is non-singular at any solution
of the KTC.
The non-singularity of H characterises the CSQC at the optimum. The non-
singularity of J enables us to use the implicit function theorem under the CSQC
when g is quasi-convex, and we exploit it in the next proposition.
Proposition 4.5. Let (x0, λ0,θ 0) be such that the KTC of Problem 2.1 are sat-
isﬁed with U CSQC and g quasi-convex. Then,
(a) ∃V0 open neighbourhood of θ0, ∀V ⊂ V0, open and connected neighbour-
hood of θ0, there is a unique function h: V → R2n,such that
(x0, λ0)=h (θ0)a n d∀θ ∈ V,∃ (x,λ) ∈ R2n, (x,λ)=h(θ)
and KTC[h(θ), θ] = 0, where KTC[.] is the vector of functions corresponding
to the equations in the KTC.
24(b) h is of type C 1 in V and its derivative is
h
0(θ)=−[Dx,λKTC[h(θ),θ ]]
−1 ◦ [DθKTC[h(θ),θ ]].
(c) If moreover, U and g are of type C p+1 in a neighbourhood of (x0, λ0, θ0),
then h is of type C p in a neighbourhood of θ0.
(d) If moreover, U and g are analytic in a neigbourhood of (x0, λ0, θ0), then
h is analytic in a neigbourhood of θ0.
The ﬁrst component of h deﬁnes the vector decision functions. Proposition
4.5 proves the local uniqueness and smoothness of the decision functions. It also
justiﬁes the usual calculus of the derivatives of the decision functions. We now
discuss the negativity property.
Proposition 4.6. Under the CSQC and the convexity of the choice set, the gen-
eralised substitution matrix, S, is negative semi-deﬁnite and is negative deﬁnite in
the tangent space to the constraints.
The negative semi-deﬁniteness of matrix S at the optimum is related to the
local stability of the equilibrium that is ensured when matrix Lxx is negative
deﬁnite in the tangent space to the constraints. At the optimum, the CSQC
25jointly with the quasi-convexity of g is, to our knowledge and for the moment, the
weakest available global condition for the negativity of the substitution matrix in
a general context.
In practice, the deﬁnition of the CSQC suggests to verify the semi-deﬁnite
negativity of ∇
2U only in a limited domain. In particular, the knowledge of all
decisions and all multipliers is not needed, and neither are veriﬁcations over the
whole spaces of decisions, multipliers and directions. Because ﬁrstly multipliers
need not be considered, and secondly decisions and directions need be checked
only in reduced domains, checking globally the CSQC may often be tractable.
Proposition 4.4 (a) provides a necessary condition on a bordered determinant
that could be used for the test. However, this test would be only valid for the
solutions of the KTC, which may be hard to calculate. Checking CSQC can also
be directly implemented by using a grid of the domain of decisions, calculating
for each knot of the grid all the eigen-values of ∇
2U in the (U − g)−admissible
directions and verifying that they are all negative. Statistical tests are available
(Kodde and Palm, 1987) to account for approximations done in the model or with
the grid. In some cases, a grid may not be necessary if the functional forms used
for U and g lead to simpliﬁcations. Then, the CSQC may sometimes be easier to
test than the SQC because the domain to explore for this test is much smaller.
265. Conclusion
In general models, the strong quasi-concavity of the objective function, which is
suﬃcient for theoretical properties of demands in consumer theory, is often ar-
bitrary and weaker global concavity conditions are desirable. We propose a new
global concavity condition, the ‘constraint-strong quasi-concavity (CSQC)’ of the
objective function that implies, for models with several non-linear constraints,
the local uniqueness and the smoothness of the decision functions as well as the
negativity of the generalised substitution matrix when used jointly with the con-
vexity of the choice set. CSQC is weaker than the strong quasi-concavity and
is parsimonious because it is strictly based on what is required globally for the
negativity of the generalised substitution matrix. Indeed, it does not restrict the
curvature of the objective function in directions that are not compatible with the
constraints or not compatible with the augmentation of the objective level. More-
over, the CSQC may be easier to check numerically for speciﬁc models than the
strong quasi-concavity. Finally, using the CSQC allows the extension of the set
of possible functional forms as compared with the strong quasi-concavity, thereby
increasing modelling ﬂexibility.
Several extensions of this paper are possible. First, ‘α-CSQC’ notions could
27be developed to (1) extend the analysis from functions to sets, (2) produce weaker
notions of generalised concavity, (3) build the bridge between the CSQC and no-
tions of generalised strict quasiconcavity. Second, the CSQC can be related to the
degree of non-convexity in optimisation problems (as deﬁn e di nT h i e nT h a c ha n d
Konno, 1997). Third, in consumer theory, the negativity of the Slutsky matrix is
related to revealed preferences axioms (Kihlstrom, Mas-Colell and Sonnenschein,
1976). We conjecture that analog results could be derived by limiting the decisions
to the constrained choice set (as in Chavas and Cox, 1993). Such results would
express the curvature properties embodied in the CSQC hypothesis. Fourth, since
imposing strong concavity globally jeopardises the ﬂexibility of usual ﬂexible func-
tional forms for cost functions and utility functions, one could investigate if, in
the presence of several constraints, imposing only the CSQC would permit to pre-
serve the ﬂexibility of such functional forms. Finally, game theory problems and
equilibria problems seem likely to be fertile application ﬁelds of the CSQC.
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Deﬁnitions of the generalised concavity notions
The generalised convexity properties for a function f are given by the
corresponding generalised concavity properties of -f.
Let X be a convex set of RN.
f:X- > R, a diﬀerentiable function, is called concave if and only if
∀(x,y) ∈ X2,f (y) − f(x) ≤∇ f(x)(y − x).
f:X- > R, a diﬀerentiable function, is called strictly concave if and
only if
∀(x,y) ∈ X2,x6= y,f(y) − f(x) < ∇f(x)(y − x).
f:X- > R, a diﬀerentiable function, is called quasi-concave if and only
if
∀(x,y) ∈ X2,(f(x) ≤ f(y)) ⇒∇ f(x)(y − x) ≥ 0.
This is equivalent by contraposition to
∀(x,y) ∈ X2,∇f(x)(y − x) < 0 ⇒ (f(x) >f(y)).
Moreover, if f is quasi-concave and twice diﬀerentiable then
∀(x,y) ∈ X2, such that x6= y,∇f(x)(y − x)=0⇒
(y − x)0fxx(x)(y − x) ≤0.
f:X- > R, is called strictly quasi-concave if and only if
∀(x,y) ∈ X2,x 6= y,∀λ ∈]0,1[,f (y) ≤ f(x) ⇒ f(x) <f ((1 −
λ)x + λy).
Then, f is strictly quasi-concave and, if, moreover, it is twice diﬀer-
entiable, it satisﬁes the same second-order condition as any quasi-concave
function.
f: X- > R, a twice diﬀerentiable function, is called strongly quasi-
concave if and only if ∀(x,y) ∈ X2, such that x 6= y,
(∇f(x)(y − x)=0 )⇒ (y − x)0fxx(x)(y − x) < 0.
Then, f is strictly quasi-concave.f:X- > R, a twice diﬀerentiable function, is called constraint-strongly
quasi-concave (CSQC) with respect to g, where g : X -> Rm is a diﬀeren-
tiable vector function, if and only if
∀(x,y) ∈ X2 such that x 6= y and g(x)=0 q,(∇g(x)(y − x)=0and
∇f(x)(y − x)=0 )⇒ (y − x)0fxx(x)(y − x) < 0.
Proofs
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 . 5 :
=⇒] Let U be CSQCoverX,l e tx0 ∈ X,v0v =1 ,¯ t>0,x 0+¯ tv ∈ X,
∀i =1 ,...q,gi(x0)=0 q, ∇gi(x0)
0v =0 , ∇U(x0)
0v =0 .
Let h(t) ≡ U(x0 + tv).W ec a l c u l a t ej(t) ≡ h(t) − h(0) = U(x0 +
tv) − U(x0).
A second order Taylor expansion of U(x0 + tv) gives
j(t)=( t2/2)v0∇
2U(x0)v + t2ε(t) because ∇U(x0)v =0 .
U CSQC implies that for x0 and v such that ∀i =1 ,...,q,gi(x0)=
0q, ∇gi(x0)
0v =0and ∇U(x0)
0v =0 ,w eh a v ev0∇
2U(x0)v<0. Then,
since ∇
2U is continuous by hypothesis, j(t) < 0 when t is small
enough. Therefore, h(t) attains a SLM at t =0for any 0 <α<
Min{−1
2v0∇
2U(x0)v : v0v =1 }.
⇐=] L e tbex 0 ∈ X, v0v =1 , ¯ t>0,x 0+¯ tv ∈ X, (∀i =1 ,...,q,gi(x0)=
0 and ∇gi(x0)0v =0 )⇒ h(t) ≡ f(x0 + tv) attains a SLM at t =0 .
Then, ∃α>0,
j(t)+αt
2 ≤ 0. (1)
Besides, a second order Taylor expansion of U(x0 + tv) about x0
yields
U(x0+tv) = U(x0)+ t2
2 v0 ∇
2U(x0)v+t2 ε(t) where ε(t) → 0 when










2 ε(t) (2)Eqs. 1 and 2 imply that 1
2v0 ∇
2U(x0)v ≤− α − ε(t), which gives
for t small enough v0 ∇
2U(x0)v<0, which proves that U is CSQC.
QED.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 . 6 :
(a) Let d be a (g −U)−admissible direction at x at the frontier of
the constraints, then from a Taylor expansion of U at x,w eh a v e




limε(d)=0when kdk → 0. Because U is CSQC we have at the
frontier of the constraints d0 ∇
2U(x)d<0.C h o o s i n gα small enough
shows that the hypersurface ∂Ep(U) is strictly below all its tangent
hyperplanes in (g − U)−admissible directions at the frontier of the
constraints.
(b) is deduced from the fact that the curvature of the epigraph in
ad i r e c t i o nd at x can be associated with −d0∇
2U(x)d with a positive
factor of proportionality to adjust for the local metric of the hyper-
surface. Under the CSQC, all points of the frontier of the constraints
are ‘elliptic’ for U in any g −U−admissible direction, while they may
be ‘parabolic or hyperbolic’ in the whole space.
(c) is a direct consequence of the deﬁnition of the CSQC and of
t h ef a c tt h a ts i n c e∇
2U is symmetric there exists an orthogonal ba-
sis of eigenvectors of ∇
2U whose ﬁrst q vectors generate the subspace
spanned by the ∇gi (theorem of the incomplete base). The orthog-
onality condition with respect to ∇U generally enables one to add a
unity from the number of possible positive or null eigenvalues of ∇
2U,
although not for an optimum since in that case the KTC are satisﬁed
and ∇U is a linear combination of the ∇gi.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 . 7 :
V = FoU gives ∇V =( F0oU).∇U,
and ∇
2V =( F0oU)∇
2U +( F00oU)∇U∇U0 .
Then, with F0 > 0,a n dm o r e o v e r∀i =1 ,...,q,∇gi0v =0and
∇U0v =0at the frontier of constraints impliesv0∇
2Uv < 0,w eh a v e
v0∇
2Vv<0. Therefore, V is CSQC. QED.Proof of Proposition 4.1:
T h ep r e m i s e so ft h ed e ﬁnition of the CSQC imply that of the def-
inition of the SQC. QED.
Proof of Proposition 4.2:
We ﬁrst give the proof for one constraint function g only. U is
CSQC and g is quasiconvex. Then, for all x and y such that x 6=
y,g(x)=0 q,∇g(x)(x−y)=0and ∇U(x)(x−y)=0 ,w eh a v e(x−y)0
∇
2U(x)(x − y) < 0 and (x − y)0∇
2g(x)(x − y) ≥ 0. Then, for all
vectors λ ≥0, for all x and y such that g(x)=0 q,∇g(x)(x − y)=
0 and ∇U(x)(x − y)=0 ,w eh a v e(x − y)0∇
2L(x,λ)(x − y) < 0
and the Lagrange function is CSQC for any vector of non-negative
multipliers. In particular, this result is true for optimal solution and
with optimal Kuhn-Tucker multipliers. The extension of the proof to
several inequality constraints is straightforward because the Hessian
matrix of a linear combination of functions is the linear combination
of the Hessian matrices of these functions. QED.
Proof of Proposition 4.3: Consequence of Proposition 4.2, ap-
plied at an optimal solution. QED.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 . 4 :











0 6=0 n+q (4)
g
i0
xz =0 ,∀i =1 ,...,q (5)
z =0and r 6=0is impossible since
P
i rigi
x =0 , is a system of
n equations with q unknown variables (ri,i= ...,q), which implies
ri =0for all i because of the hypothesis of constraint qualiﬁcation
(∇g is full rank).
z 6=0is also impossible because from eqs. 3 and 5 we would obtainz0Uxxz =0and gi0
xz =0 ,∀i =1 ,...,q, in contradiction to the
CSQC for a solution of the KTC, ∇U lies in the vector space gen-
erated by ∇g. Therefore, no non-null vector (z0,r 0)0 exists such that
(z0,r 0)H =0 , which implies that H is non singular.
(b) The proof is similar to that of (a), taking advantage of the fact
that gi0
xz =0 ,∀i =1 ,...,q implies z0gi0
xxz ≥ 0,∀i =1 ,...,q.
Proof of Proposition 4.5:
The system describing the KTC has n+q equations whose vector
function is denoted KTC[.], and n+q+p variables (x, λ, θ). Because
∇U, ∇g and g a r eo ft y p eC 1, KTC[.] is of type C1.S i n c eR n+q+p is
an open set (this is as well the case if the regime of interest is deﬁned
by strict inequality for non-binding constraints) and since |J|,w h i c hi s
the Jacobian determinant associated with the KTC for their solution
in (x, λ), is non-singular at a solution of the KTC when U is CSQC
and g is quasiconcave, we can apply the theorem of implicit functions.
This generates all the results of the proposition. QED.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 . 6 : The CSQC implies the SSOC and
the SSOC implies S negative semideﬁnite in the tangent space to
the constraints and orthogonal to the constraint gradients (Pauwels,
1979).